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Dispositional happiness and affective forecasting: General or speciﬁc effect?
Virginie Christophe and Michel Hansenne*
Department of Psychology, Personality and Individual Differences Unit, University of Liège, 5, Bd du Rectorat, B-4000 Liège,
Belgium
(Received 12 August 2014; accepted 1 June 2015)
Recent ﬁndings suggest that dispositional traits can inﬂuence personal affective forecasting. In this study, we investigated
the relationship between dispositional happiness and affective prediction about academic performance among
undergraduate students. Participants were asked to predict their emotional reactions on a 7-point Likert scale in regard to
an important exam’s result two months prior obtaining their results. All the participants were contacted by SMS (Short
Text Message) 8 h after the results were available and were requested to rate their actual emotional feelings on the same
scale. According to their scores on the subjective happiness scale, participants were assigned into ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy’
groups. Results show no emotional prediction differences between the two groups for extreme results (i.e. good and bad
results). In contrast, happy participants predicted less negative emotional feelings than unhappy ones for moderate
results. No differences appear for the emotional feelings assessed the day they received their exam’s scores. These
ﬁndings support the idea that dispositional happiness is related to emotional prediction and, more particularly, indicate
that happiness induces more positive feelings concerning moderate future events, but not for extreme ones. This study
suggests that happiness induces a positive view about emotional coping for future intermediate accomplishments only
and not a positive view of the future in general.
Keywords: affective forecasting; happiness; individual differences
Introduction
Prediction of future events is probably a distinctive abil-
ity of the human mind. From simple to important life
choices, most decisions are based on people’s predictions
of how each outcome will make them feel in the future
taking into account past experiences, leading to affective
forecasts (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009; Kermer, Driver-Linn,
Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006; Mellers & McGraw, 2001).
Several lines of evidence suggest that emotional reac-
tions people anticipate often differ markedly from those
they actually experience in response to affective stimuli
and events. Indeed, people frequently overestimate how
happy they will be after positive events and how sad
they will feel after negative ones, which has been named
the impact bias (Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, &
Axsom, 2000). This trend to overestimate the intensity
of emotional responses is maybe the most commonly
observed forecasting error. The main explanation of this
bias is that people neglect, when they forecast an emo-
tional experience, they will use several coping strategies
when the event occurs. Coping mechanisms constitutes
of the psychological immune system which is massively
neglected during affective forecasting (immune neglect;
Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998).
This is particularly critical because affective forecasting
signiﬁcantly inﬂuences a range of important life choices
(Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008),
such as decisions to pursue diagnostic medical testing
(Rhodes & Strain, 2008), doing physical exercises
(Ruby, Dunn, Perrino, Gillis, & Viel, 2011), and getting
divorced (Lucas, 2005).
Despite the fact that personality strongly shapes our
future behaviors, thoughts, and feelings, and that per-
sonality is related to emotions, the associations between
personality and affective forecasting have received lim-
ited attention. Indeed, only few recent studies examined
the inﬂuence of individual differences on affective fore-
casting, and an emerging body of evidence suggests that
individual differences play an important role in affective
forecasting. This is a critical issue. Based on the impor-
tance of affective prediction in many situations, such as
engaging in a romantic relationship, changing job posi-
tion, and pursuing medical diagnostics, an important
question of future research is whether speciﬁc psycho-
logical interventions centered on dispositional traits
could improve the effectiveness of affective forecasting
and, more generally, decision-making in different con-
texts (Hoerger, Chapman, Epstein, & Duberstein, 2012).
However, recent literature exploring the link between
personality and affective forecasting is far from clear;
some data show a direct link between personality and
affective predictions, whereas other data report a
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personality neglect effect occurring during affective
prediction. Hoerger and Quirk (2010) showed that neu-
roticism and extraversion are associated to experienced
emotional reactions to an emotional event (i.e.
Valentine’s Day); they also reported the same associa-
tions for anticipated emotional reactions, meaning that
personality modulates affective forecasting. The same
group extended their results to psychopathological symp-
toms (Hoerger, Quirk, Chapman, & Duberstein, 2012).
They found that individuals characterized by dysphoric
states overrate their negative emotional reactions about
Valentine’s Day one month before. In the same vein,
Wenze, Gunthert, and German (2012) reported that par-
ticipants characterized by depressive symptoms exhibited
stronger negative mood prediction biases and weaker
positive mood prediction biases. Moreover, introverts
perform an affective forecasting error when they were
asked to imagine acting in an extraverted way (Zelenski
et al., 2013); more particularly, introverts overestimate
the negative feelings associated with their extraverted
behaviors. All the aforementioned results suggest that
neuroticism and negative relative traits (i.e. dysphoric
and depressive symptoms) increase the impact bias in
affective forecasting. In contrast, Quoidbach and Dunn
(2010) reported that dispositional happiness was related
to experienced feelings the day after a positive event
among undergraduate students occurred (i.e. receiving
academic grades) but was not associated to predicted
feelings for this event. They found also that neuroticism
and optimism were largely neglected when participants
had to forecast their emotional reactions to Barack
Obama’s 2008 election; however, these traits were
related to their real emotional reactions assessed the day
after the election. These results suggested that because
people forget the impact of their dispositional traits on
future feelings; they inaccurately predict their emotional
reactions, what Quoidbach and Dunn (2010) called per-
sonality neglect effect. For instance, neurotic individuals
neglect their own inclination for distress, resulting in
overestimating the happiness they would otherwise
experience in response to a positive event.
Some reasons can clarify why the recent existing
literature about the inﬂuence of individual differences on
affective forecasting is inconsistent. One possible reason
is that the nature of the event on which the affective
forecasting is requested differs largely between the stud-
ies (e.g. Valentine’s Day, extraverted behaviors, Barack
Obama’s election, and academic grades). Additionally,
the delay between the event and the rating of actual feel-
ings varies between studies, as well as the way in which
the questions about the predicted and actual feelings
are asked (i.e. the role of temporal focus; Buehler &
McFarland, 2001). Finally, majority of studies consider
the target event as positive or negative, whereas in many
situations, an event maybe also neutral.
In order to clarify and extend the ﬁndings about the
impact of dispositional traits on affective forecasting, the
aim of this study was to investigate the relationship
between dispositional happiness and affective prediction
about academic performance among undergraduate
students by considering academic performance on a three-
point continuum (good, acceptable, and bad). Based on
Quoidbach and Dunn (2010) ﬁndings, we tested if disposi-
tional happiness would be related to experienced emo-
tional reactions, but not to predicted ones. Alternatively,
because happiness is related to positive forecasting, we
expected that students exhibiting higher levels of
happiness would predict more positive feelings about this
speciﬁc future event. In addition, we tested whether happi-
ness would induce a general effect (i.e. more positive
feelings for all grade outcomes) or a speciﬁc one (i.e. more
positive feelings for moderate and bad outcomes only).
Methods
Participants
The sample consisted of 105 undergraduate students (32
males) with a mean age of 23.3 years (ranging from 18 to
33 years, SD = 3.77). All the participants were enrolled
into the second year of psychology bachelor and recruited
into one important class (i.e. cognitive psychology). The
ethical committee of the University of Liège Psychology
Faculty approved the protocol, and the participants gave
their informed consent to participate in the study.
Procedure
At the end of a cognitive psychology class, participants
were asked to predict their emotional reactions for when
they would obtain their results of the exam two months
later. The affective reactions were assessed on a 7-point
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very bad) to 7 (very good).
Participants should forecast their reactions for three
possibilities: achieving bad (below 4/10), acceptable
(between 5 and 6/10), or good results (higher than 7/10).
According to a local convention, scores of 4.5 and 6.5
were turned to 5 and 7, respectively. These exam cutoffs
correspond to local classiﬁcation applicable for exam
scores, unsatisfactory, acceptable, and distinction, respec-
tively. Overall happiness was assessed using the subjec-
tive happiness scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper,
1999). This well-validated instrument composed of four
7-point items provides a global, subjective assessment of
whether an individual is a happy or an unhappy person,
which encompasses both emotional and cognitive
well-being. Participants were assigned to ‘happy’ and
‘unhappy’ groups on the basis of high and low scores
for SHS, with high-scoring and low-scoring subjects
selected as being above and below the median of the































score distribution, respectively. As scheduled, all the par-
ticipants were contacted by SMS (Short Text Message)
approximately at 08:00 PM (8 h after the exam scores
were posted) and were requested to rate their current
affective states on the same 7-point Likert scale. A total
of 105 participants from the initial 154 (75%) completed
the second assessment. All the participants completed the
follow-up mood assessment within 1 h after having
received the SMS.
Statistical analyses
All the statistical analyses were performed with Statistica
(10.1) for Windows. In order to compare current and
predicted emotional states; only data on predictions for
the grade obtained were analyzed. A 2 groups (happy
vs. unhappy) × 3 grades obtained (good results vs.
acceptable results vs. bad results) × 2 times (predicted
vs. real) repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on affective state was conducted, with groups
and grades as between-subjects factors and time as
within-subject factor. Correlational analyses between
happiness and participants’ predicted and actual emo-
tional reactions, split by grades of the exam, were also
computed.
Results
Among the participants, the percentages of bad, accept-
able, and good results were 35% (N = 37), 27%
(N = 28), and 38% (N = 40), respectively. Repeated-
measures ANOVA shows a signiﬁcant time × grade
interaction (F2,99 = 25,65, p < 0.001), meaning that pre-
dicted emotional feelings are overestimated as compared
to experienced ones. Tukey post-hoc comparisons show
that participants predicted higher positive feelings
(M = 6.5; SD = 0.5; 95% CI = [6.3, 6.7]) than experi-
enced ones (M = 5.7; SD = 1.0; 95% CI = [5.3, 6.0]) for
good results (p < 0.001, d = 0.96, 95% CI = [0.79, 1.30])
and predicted lower positive feelings (M = 1.8; SD = 0.7;
95% CI = [1.5, 2.0]) as compared to experienced ones
(M = 3.0; SD = 1.3; 95% CI = [2.5, 3.4]) for bad results
(p < 0.001, d = 1.14, 95% CI = [0.72, 1.37]). In contrast,
no difference appears for moderate results (p = 0.92,
d = 0.15, 95% CI = [−0.26, 0.72]) (Figure 1). A signiﬁ-
cant time × group interaction (F1,99 = 3.95, p = 0.04)
reveals that happy participants predicted more positive
feelings than those experienced, and the opposite pattern
is observed for unhappy participants. Post-hoc compar-
isons indicate a tendency to signiﬁcance between groups
for predicted feelings (p = 0.09, d = 0.16, 95% CI =
[−0.46, 0.72]), but not for experienced feelings
(p = 0.87, d = 0.05, 95% CI = [−0.37, 0.54]).
Despite a lack of signiﬁcant group × grade × time
interaction, separate group × grade ANOVAs for pre-
dicted and experienced feelings show a signiﬁcant
group × grade interaction for predicted feelings
(F2,99 = 2.90, p = 0.05), but not for experienced feelings
(F2,99 = 1.27, p = 0.28). Post-hoc comparisons show that
happy participants predicted higher positive feelings
(M = 5.2; SD = 0.8; 95% CI = [4.7, 5.7]) for moderate
results as compared to unhappy ones (M = 4.2;
SD = 1.1; 95% CI = [3.6, 4.9]) (p < 0.001, d = 0.99,
95% CI = [0.53, 1.57]), but not for bad (M = 1.8;
SD = 0.6; 95% CI = [1.5, 2.2], (M = 1.7; SD = 0.7; 95%
CI = [1.3, 2.1]) (p = 0.98, d = 0.18, 95% CI = [−0.15,
0.52]) or good results (M = 6.6; SD = 0.6; 95% CI =
[6.3, 6.9], (M = 6.4; SD = 0.5; 95% CI = [6.2, 6.6])
(p = 0.99, d = 0.30, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.51]) (Figure 2,
left). Concerning experienced feelings, no differences
appear between happy and unhappy participants for any
grades (good, M = 5.8; SD = 0.9; 95% CI = [5.4, 6.3],
M = 5.5; SD = 1.2; 95% CI = [5.0, 6.0], p = 0.94; moder-
ate, M = 4.5; SD = 1.2; 95% CI = [3.7, 5.3], M = 4.5;
SD = 1.3; 95% CI = [3.8, 5.2], p = 0.99; bad, M = 2.7;
SD = 1.2; 95% CI = [2.0, 3.3], M = 3.2; SD = 1.3; 95%
CI = [2.6, 3.8], p = 0.75; d = 0.32, 95% CI = [−0.10,
0.83], d = 0.01, 95% CI = [−0.68, 0.66], d = 0.44, 95%
CI = [−0.17, 1.01], respectively) (Figure 2, right).
Correlation analyses showed no signiﬁcant correla-
tions between happiness on the SHS and both predicted
and real emotional reactions for bad (r = 0.04, p = 0.81;
r = −0.14, p = 0.41), moderate (r = 0.27, p = 0.16;
r = 0.09, p = 0.65), and good (r = 0.18, p = 0.25;
r = 0.01, p = 0.97) grades on the exam.
Discussion
The main result of this study is that dispositional
happiness inﬂuences affective forecasting among
undergraduate students when they predict how they will
feel about the result of an important exam, supporting
the emerging literature which reports that individual
differences are of interest in the domain of affective
Figure 1. Differences between predicted and experienced
emotional reactions as regards grades of the exam for all the
participants (* = p < 0.001).































forecasting research. Indeed, whereas most research on
affective forecasting has examined whether people mis-
predict their emotions on average, this study is one of
the very few to examine whether individual differences
moderate this effect. Regardless of grade outcomes,
results show that happy participants overestimate how
they will feel after getting an exam’s result and that
unhappy participants underrate how they will feel, mean-
ing that happiness contributes to the impact bias. The
ﬁndings are similar to those of Hoerger and Quirk
(2010) who showed that extraverts predicted higher posi-
tive feelings after a positive event and that neurotics esti-
mated lower positive ones. More largely, our results
conﬁrm the idea that personal dispositions are related to
the way people made affective forecasts (Hoerger, Quirk,
et al., 2012; Wenze et al., 2012).
The present ﬁndings are not in agreement with the
results of Quoidbach and Dunn (2010) who reported that
students neglect the impact of their dispositional level of
happiness in predicting their emotions concerning their
overall grades of the term. In contrast, dispositional
happiness played an important role in shaping their
actual emotional experiences. In contrast, our results
show that dispositional happiness inﬂuences predicted
feelings, but not experienced ones. Some methodological
discrepancies could explain the divergent results. Firstly,
the event selected in Quoidbach and Dunn’s study was
the global term grade, whereas in this study, the event
was the grade of one major exam. Therefore, conse-
quences of good or bad full-term grades are more impor-
tant than succeeding or not an important exam. This
difference raises the question about the various emotional
events examined in affective forecasting research (e.g.
academic performance, Valentine’s Day, election, and
soccer) and the need to develop a typical protocol. How-
ever, the diversity of emotional events allows us to con-
sider affective predictions in a full range of situations in
order to identify general or speciﬁc effects. Secondly,
participants in our study were asked to report how they
felt 8 h after receiving their results, whereas a period of
two weeks was chosen in the study of Quoidbach and
Dunn. Consequently, we assessed the immediate emo-
tional effect, and not an enduring emotional state. The
immediate emotional effect was a better choice in our
study, because emotional reaction about one exam’s
result decreases more rapidly than affective reaction con-
cerning global term grades.
Interestingly, in this study, results show that people
with happy personalities tend to overestimate their future
happiness compared to less happy people, but only for
relatively mundane events (i.e. a moderate result). In
contrast, both happy and unhappy individuals made simi-
lar forecasts for extreme events (top grades and poor
grades, respectively). In other words, unhappy partici-
pants predict accurately their feelings on moderate
results, meaning that happiness induces a speciﬁc impact
bias limited to moderate events, rather than a general
one. Despite signiﬁcant results, correlation analyses sug-
gest the same outcomes since the correlation between
predicted feelings and happiness for moderate results is
the only one approaching the statistical signiﬁcance level
(p = 0.16). The ﬁndings suggest that happiness does not
modulate the classical impact bias for extreme outcomes,
but only for moderate ones. For good and bad results,
happy and unhappy participants do the same forecasting
error. In these extreme situations, the dispositional traits
are not strong enough to modify the situational inﬂuence;
predictions concerning a positive event are higher than
those experienced, and predictions for bad results are
lower than those felt regardless happiness. For extreme
results, individuals ignore their personal dispositions
focusing only on the event, leading to what Quoidbach
and Dunn (2010) termed “the personality neglect.”
However, the positive impact of happiness plays a role
for intermediate results. This ﬁnding could be interpreted
as regards the depressive realism theory (Allan, Siegel,
& Hannah, 2007) suggesting that depressed subjects
perform more realistic judgments due to the lack of
Figure 2. Differences between happy and unhappy participants as regards grades of the exam for predicted (left) and actual (right)
emotional reactions (* = p < 0.001).































normative positivity biases in particular contexts, such as
evaluating oneself or estimating the possibility of future
events. Normative biases are probably stronger for
extreme outcomes preventing the effect of happiness.
However, it should be acknowledged that the effect
reported in this study is relatively small, and future stud-
ies must be conducted to replicate the idea that happiness
colors only less signiﬁcant events.
The present results contrasting routine vs. extreme
events may also help to understand mixed results sup-
porting a personality neglect effect in affective forecast-
ing. Indeed, one interesting avenue for future researches
is to investigate affective forecasting for events consid-
ered on a continuum, and not only as a positive or nega-
tive outcome. For a moderate event, participants (even if
the effect is small) seem to account for their disposi-
tional happiness, rather than overlooking it when making
predictions. This means that potential avenues to
improve effective forecasting must emphasis both
dispositional traits and consequences of the event.
Instead of viewing personality as a devil that alters affec-
tive forecasting, it may have beneﬁcial effects, such as
enabling realistic judgments. It must be acknowledged,
however, that in this study, conﬂating a happiness mea-
sure with personality seems to miss some of the nuances
between the two, and future researches must focus on
personality dimensions.
Finally, the present ﬁndings conﬁrm the general
impact bias when people forecast their emotional
feelings about future events (Dunn & Laham, 2006;
Wilson et al., 2000). Nevertheless, this bias is
observed only for extreme results (i.e. good and bad),
but not for intermediate results, meaning that misjudg-
ment concerns merely important events. When people
are confronted to predict their feelings for less impor-
tant events, or neutral ones, the estimations are rather
good, even if this study shows that dispositional
happiness leads an overrating of moderate event.
Again, it is very important when conducting future
researches on affective forecasting to investigate both
relevant and ordinary events.
In conclusion, the study provides additional evi-
dences of the importance of individual differences on
affective forecasting. More particularly, dispositional
happiness plays a little role as a positive factor swaying
emotional prediction about academic performance among
undergraduate students for moderate results, suggesting
that happiness could induce a positive view about emo-
tional coping of future intermediate accomplishments
only, and not a general positive view of future.
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